A coupling model based on hazard and operability analysis (HAZOP) and fault tree analysis is proposed and used to analyze the failure of a low-temperature distillation station (LTDS). It is found that the formation of scale in the deamination tower in the LTDS is the most significant cause for the failure. The scale was mainly composed of SrSO4, CaCO₃, CaSO4, and MgCO₃, which were determined by various techniques from the gas-field water. Dynamic weight loss experiments were conducted to estimate the corrosion rate of 304 steel with different cleaning solutions. The corrosion behaviors of the metal in the deamination tower were further investigated in three types of cleaning solution via potentiodynamic polarization method. The cleaning solution composed of 6% sulfamic acid, LAN826, JFC, and a defoaming agent could safely and quickly remove the scale covering the LTDS at 50°C. In addition, the optimal cleaning time was found to be 6 h.

Language matters for effective leadership and culture. And the language embedded in the term “operational discipline” is not helpful. This term is inconsistent with decades of learning on cause analysis, systems thinking, and human performance. Humans typically do not fail because they are not disciplined enough. Failures occur for other reasons that stem from the systems within which the humans are working. For many people, the term “discipline” has a negative or punitive connotation. And the term “operational” focuses the spotlight on operations. The two terms taken together may imply to some people that willful operator deviations are the root cause of some incidents. Failures typically involve a range of management processes and functional groups. Thorough failure analysis can identify systemic causes, and follow-up corrective actions may be targeted at the upstream sources. Healthy culture requires a positive, inclusive, and curious environment that seeks to continuously learn and improve without casting blame. Even if the term “operational discipline” is not intended to place blame, the choice of words defeats that aspiration. When seeking to improve process safety culture, choose language that supports a positive learning environment of ownership and empowerment by the workforce. And support those words through management actions.

Due to environmental variability of combustible liquid road transportation, it is difficult to analyze risk accurately. This article proposes a method for real-time analysis of the risk of flammable liquid road transportation using a fuzzy Bayesian network. This method combines the binary logistic regression model with the bow-tie model to analyze the influencing factors and accident evolution. Then, a Bayesian network framework is established based on the fault tree model. In the case of limited historical accident statistics, the fuzzy set theory and Leaky Noisy-OR theory are used to determine the prior probability and conditional probability of Bayesian network nodes, and ALOHA software is used to simulate the dangerous area of the accident to define further the safe evacuation range and emergency rescue material demand. Taking the road transportation of a tanker in Beijing as an example, the accident probability is updated in real time by monitoring the data of transportation nodes, and the change rule of risk level with internal and external conditions at different times is analyzed. The research shows that this method can dynamically describe the road transportation accidents of hazardous chemicals with the GPS data of vehicles.

The start-up of a process plant is subject to deviations that can become initiating causes of process safety events. Even a process plant that has been in operation for a long time and has not undergone any significant changes is subject to risks during the start-up procedure. The objective of this work is to share good practices related to the start-up of process plants that were implemented at Cargill's Biodiesel production plant in Três Lagoas, Brazil in order to avoid Process Safety accidents.

Under mechanical abuse, the failure of lithium-ion batteries occurs in various stages, characterized by different force, temperature, and voltage responses, and require in situ measurements for analysis. First, four sizes of commercially available lithium-iron phosphate batteries (LFPB), namely 18650, 22650, 26650, and 32650, were subjected to quasistatic lateral and longitudinal compression and nail penetration tests. The failure, characterized by the voltage drop and temperature rise at the onset of the first internal short-circuit (ISC), was identified by an Aurdino-based voltage sensor module and a temperature measurement module, respectively. The battery failure load and peak temperature at the onset of ISC were found to rely strongly on the battery size. The failure was delayed for small-sized 18650 batteries during lateral compression, unlike in longitudinal compression and nail penetration tests. At the onset of ISC, the temperature rise above the ambient value was different for different LFPBs. It was found to be maximum (36.4°C) for LFPB 32650 under longitudinal compression and minimum (1.5°C) under lateral compression tests among the considered geometries. Further, LFPB 26650 exhibited a balanced thermal behavior during the test. Such thermal response can be sensed timely for effective thermal management of lithium-ion batteries.

This paper reports a new method using a modified Schlenk line for quantitative charging and safe disposal of gases in a gas-phase accelerating rate calorimetry (ARC) test. The modified Schlenk line is capable of accurately measuring the mass of gas(s) charged to the ARC bomb. The method conveniently allows loading a single gas or multiple gases for reaction. It also provides dosing (or shot addition) capability to add a gaseous sample for when the gas is too reactive to be preloaded with other components. The modified Schlenk line enables safely handling toxic and extremely reactive gaseous chemicals, including collecting gases for further characterization, and disposing the gaseous products and unreacted samples into neutralizing scrubbers after the ARC run. The modified Schlenk line can also be utilized to test solid, liquid, or gas/liquid/solid mixed phases under specific atmospheres. Additional capabilities of the assembly line include quick leak checking and easily removing unwanted air/moisture in the headspace of the bomb or impurities (residual solvents) in the sample before an ARC run, resulting in more reliable data. The utility of this method is demonstrated in the thermal evaluation of the chlorination of toluene with chlorine gas and the thermal stability study of a halogenated ethane.

LOPA (Layer Of Protection Analysis) is a risk analysis method developed to highlight various layers of protection from the process design to the emergency response. In its basic conception, each barrier is associated with a Risk Reduction Factor (RRF) corresponding to the inverse of the probability of failure (e.g., RRF = 10 corresponds to a probability of failure on demand [PFD] = 0.1). In its most common form, the LOPA method uses orders of magnitude for the probability of failure and frequency values generally inspired by those reported by the center for chemical process safety books. Frequency of accidents then consists of multiplying the frequency of the initiating event by the PFD allocated to each barrier. The LOPA method is an attractive approach because, at first sight, it is relatively easy to implement and can be used by engineers who are not necessarily specialists in industrial risk analysis. In reality, this approach can quickly lead to an erroneous estimate of accident frequency. This article presents how LOPA can be applied in a quantified way and the expected benefits. A practical application example related to tank overflow will highlight the advantages of using a fully quantified method.

During the execution of a change using Management of Change (MOC), the risk to the facility is increased because things are in flux until the change is completed and documented and personnel trained. During this time P&IDs, SOPs, and other procedures are being developed or changed. Construction or tie-ins in preparation, or as part of the change, are going on. Thus, during the change until it is complete, the potential for error, and therefore the risk, is increased. This potential for error emanates from the use of not-yet implemented P&IDs, the use of unapproved or old procedures, and unintended connections and flows from or to piping that contains hazardous materials. Additional risk results from an incorrect workflow where the appropriate individuals were not included in the review or the necessary approvals are bypassed. Another possible risk is unknowingly impacting an existing safeguard by changing related equipment. Thus, the MOC process needs to be carefully managed, not only for an individual MOC but the aggregate of all the MOCs that are being worked on at the same time. The elements for minimizing the risk of a change are described, and a tool to monitor the MOC process, which includes automatic metrics, is illustrated.

The safety practice of depressurization of pipelines by flare system in the hydrocarbon industry is not sufficient for pipelines in the subsea production process. There are many challenges in the subsea production process due to multiphase fluid flow. Failure of a process to arrive at its safe state could result in fatality, significant property damage, and can lead to a disastrous environment. The safe state of a process is identified through the consequence of hazard and risk assessments at critical modes of operations. A well-designed safety instrumented function (SIF) can prevent escalation of minor malfunction into an accident. The prime objective of this work is to obtain the required safety integrity level (SIL) for subsea High Integrity Pressure Protection System (HIPPS). Based on hazard assessment (HAZOP) and risk assessment (LOPA), SIL for SIF is recommended, and finally through reliability calculations, the SIL for subsea HIPPS is determined.

Hydrogen is a key energy carrier for modern society. The breaking of the hydrogen bonds within traditional hydrocarbon molecules has been the primary mode of energy utilization since the industrial revolution. An increased focus on “net-zero” greenhouse gas emissions, specifically carbon dioxide and methane, has resulted in a global push for lower carbon energy vectors, including pure hydrogen. Accurately modeling the dispersion, fire, and explosion hazards associated with new and existing hydrogen production, distribution and transportation networks, and consumption is a key component to the safe expansion of these networks. BakerRisk performed a series of very lean hydrogen-air vapor cloud explosion (VCE) tests as part of an internal research effort. The goal of these tests was to better understand the VCE hazards associated with very lean hydrogen-air mixtures (≤14% H2). Flame speeds and blast loads were measured using high-speed video and an array of dynamic pressure transducers. This paper discusses the test setup and test results, including a comparison with data from prior tests. The measured flame speeds are compared to those predicted using computational fluid dynamics analysis and referenced to deflagration-to-detonation criteria. Discussion regarding the application of these test results to facility siting studies is also provided.

In the last few years, the energy industry has seen an exponential increase in the quantity of lithium-ion (LI) utility-scale battery energy storage systems (BESS). Standards, codes, and test methods have been developed that address battery safety and are constantly improving as the industry gains more knowledge about BESS. These standards address the minimum requirements for shipping, installation, commissioning, and operation of the battery. In addition to minimum standards, there are recommended practices that enhance the safety of utility-scale energy storage installations. This paper reviews the recommended practices that, through knowledge and experience with BESS, are being adopted by electric utilities. The focus is on fire, explosion, and toxic emission hazards of thermal runaway events of the battery and their mitigation. The paper also addresses utility considerations of minimum requirements dictated by codes, standards, and expectations of authorities having jurisdiction (AHJs) and insurance companies. This paper is intended to increase the technical acumen of environmental health and safety personnel and to provide practical information to utilities and developers installing LI BESS.

Management of change (MOC) is the cornerstone of a successful risk-based process safety (RBPS) program. Safe operation and maintenance of facilities that manufacture or store hazardous chemicals require robust process safety management (PSM) systems. The MOC element of RBPS program establishes a formal, documented authorization process to manage changes that may introduce unexpected new hazards or increase the risk of existing ones. Most companies have established MOC systems to evaluate and approve (or reject) proposed changes, leading managers and supervisors to assume that this PSM element is well in hand. Now that the MOC system is up and running, however, have you noticed “backsliding”, complacency, or just going through the motions? Or, perhaps there is reasonably good usage of the system in your company, but you consider that there ought to be more value to be gotten from the MOC system data.

Several plants in Brazil have mature assets or use equipment that comes from decommissioned facilities. In addition, the culture of process safety in Brazil is an under-researched topic that has only recently begun to attract corporate attention. Since catastrophic accidents are not very common, any accident related to the process can result in very large losses in terms of damage to equipment and loss of human and social capital. In mature process plants, these issues are even more sensitive because their organization may not yet have developed an effective integrity management program. Nevertheless, it is a proven fact that the assets of these plants are often nearing the end of their residual lifetime. Therefore, the present work aims to develop a high-level checklist to evaluate the mechanical integrity and identify possible failures in the integrity management of vessels and tanks, based in good engineering practices, Regulatory Standard 13 (NR 13), API 579-1/ASME FFS-1, API RP 580, API RP 581, HSE (Health and Safety Executive) requirements, and other relevant standards as references. The checklist ts divided into six sections, namely (1) Brazilian Regulatory Standard 13 (NR 13); (2) Design and manufacturing; (3) Operation; (4) Management systems; (5) Deterioration mechanism; and (6) Risk-based inspection, as the most relevant criteria for evaluating the integrity of mature pressure vessels and tanks.

The number of new-energy vehicles is steadily increasing worldwide, and joint refueling and charging stations will be increasingly constructed and developed in China. A CNG leakage at joint stations can lead to superimposed consequences, including fire (flash fire, pool fire, jet fire), explosion, and release of toxic and hazardous gases. Based on FLACS and SAFETI, the impact of leakage aperture and wind direction on CNG leakage diffusion are analyzed by modeling a joint refueling and charging station in Shaanxi, China. The safe distance between charging piles and leakage points is investigated in the worst case scenario. The superimposed consequences of leakage in joint stations under different scenarios are analyzed, and the individual risk is analyzed at stations. This study shows that the larger the leakage aperture, the larger the CNG leakage dispersion range under the same wind directions and wind speeds, and the higher the wind speed, the more volatile the gas under the same leakage apertures. The safety distance of the charging pile should reach at least 37 and 40 m considering leaks in the tanker and gas storage well, respectively. The impact range of superimposed consequences shows the descending order of jet fire > flash fire > pool fire.

The use of hydrogen as a fuel and energy carrier is increasing globally. Existing processes are being expanded, and hydrogen is also being incorporated into novel technologies and processes. As new hydrogen applications and processes are being developed, it is important for industry professionals to understand the associated hazards and how they differ from the hazards of hydrocarbon fuels. While best practices and risk management strategies for hydrocarbon fuel processes are mature and generally known within thre industry, the hazards of hydrogen processes, such as liquid storage tanks and fuel dispensers, are less commonly understood by those who may be planning to enter this industry. The objective of this paper is to explain the hazards of hydrogen and to provide a comparison of these hazards with those of commonly used hydrocarbon fuels through a review of the flammable hazards, consequence modeling, and select hydrogen-release incidents. The analysis will provide current industry risk practitioners with useful guidance to understand the hazards associated with this increasingly popular fuel. This paper provides information in three main sections. The first section provides a review and comparison of fire and explosion hazards for hydrogen as compared to hydrocarbon fuels. Second section provides consequence modeling results comparing hydrogen and hydrocarbon fuels for similar release scenarios using a common software model (DNV Phast version 8.71). Third section provides a review of select hydrogen incidents.

This work focuses on the development of an approach considering the application of the bow tie methodology for monitoring and reporting the performance status of safety barriers used in collapse prevention of dams that store water for refinery process purposes, as well as for mitigation of the consequences in case of materialization of this scenario. After elaboration of the bow tie diagram in collaboration with technical specialists directly involved in dams' safety, the integrity of barriers is determined based on information collected from each dam at an operational level. Considering the literature review carried out, one of the most important contributions of this research (besides the bow tie diagram itself) consists in the proposition of a periodic reporting process of barriers performance indicators to managers responsible for each barrier in order to properly support risk management, permeating all the relevant technical and hierarchical levels (including communications upwards the board—top management). Its main motivation lies in lessons learned from several past major accidents, such as Macondo, Texas City, and, the Brumadinho catastrophe itself, regarding the need for safety information to “travel upwards” on the companies' hierarchy in order to properly and quickly support the decision-making process, contributing to the strengthening of safety culture inside the organizations.

This paper will provide an overview of the recently issued CCPS Process Safety for Engineers: An Introduction, Second Edition and how to use it. The objective of the text is to support teaching and learning of risk-based process safety fundamentals as defined by the Center for Chemical Process Safety (CCPS). It also addresses the Accreditation Board for Engineering and Technology (ABET) Program Criteria for Chemical Engineering, which requires that chemical engineering curricula include consideration of the hazards relevant to chemical processes. This book can be used in meeting that requirement either as a curriculum for an undergraduate-level process safety course or to provide process safety content into common chemical engineering courses. The team creating the book included professors who teach process safety. The book is founded on the CCPS risk-based process safety elements and points to numerous tools to support the instructor in teaching and the engineer in conducting process safety fundamentals. Each chapter begins with a detailed process safety incident case study and includes what a new engineer might do, problem sets, numerous references, and a generic presentation file for use by professors.

Historically, chemical complexes originated from a single company that developed a large site with significant infrastructure and diverse operating units. However, as corporate objectives change, companies frequently consider alternative business models such as mergers, acquisitions, leases, and licensing agreements. These deals (referred to as mergers and acquisitions [M&A] in this paper) often result in a shift from the single owner/operator structure toward other ownership, operating, and service provider models. These models can create substantial value; however, if not properly managed, they can also increase risk. Assessing these deals to manage process safety risk is challenging; deals are often confidential, the scope is sometimes fluid, and there is limited time to complete the process safety evaluations. If significant deal risks cannot be mitigated, concerns need to be elevated to upper management so they can be addressed before the deal is signed. Contract provisions may also be needed to clarify expectations and ensure continued safe operation. This paper discusses the challenges in assessing potential M&A deals from a process safety lens and describes a work process for engaging with the M&A team, conducting preliminary screening and more detailed assessments, communicating the results, and incorporating key agreements into the contract language.

Clear and positive process safety leadership is at the core of managing high-hazard businesses, and it is vital to ensure that risks are effectively managed. Cargill has designed a learning experience program for senior operations leadership in Latin America to provide leaders with an appropriate level of process safety knowledge that will support them taking better decisions, thereby reducing the likelihood of a process safety event at their manufacturing sites. The purpose of the program is to provide structural and focused learning of essential risk management practices and to allow the leaders time to discuss and learn about the risks and hazards on their sites. The program was designed to include kick-off sessions, several learning experiences, and a final certification step. This program was deployed in Latin America in 2021 and, within 1 year, has certified 39 senior leaders for high-hazard facilities. Several more certifications are expected to occur in the following months when all senior leaders would have gone through this learning program.

H2S gas emissions occur in various processes, especially in the purification of polluted waters, mining, and petroleum refining processes and this extremely dangerous chemical has serious toxic emission, explosion, and fire effects. These physical effects vary considerably depending on the source strength. Therefore, consequence analyzes based on source strength models are critical components in the process of assessing hazards. In this study, a consequence analysis was performed with accident scenarios related to different sources of H2S gas. ALOHA 5.4.7 and EFFECTS 8.0.1 Software were used for physical effects modeling. Modeling studies were conducted on direct source (continuous release:100 m3/s, 5 m3/s), puddle source (100 m3, 5 m3), tank source (vertical-horizontal cylindrical, spherical, 1.57 m3), and gas pipeline source with ALOHA Software. Possible Gas LOC (Levels of Concern) scenario Leak (G3) and Gas LOC scenario release in 10 min (G2) scenarios were studied with EFFECTS Software. When the results of both software were compared with each other, it was seen that the effects of thermal radiation and explosion were of similar order and value, and the toxic effect values were very different from each other. Both software allow for a release above ground level for gases that behave as neutrally buoyant. The main difference between the dispersion models used in the software is that the gas is assumed to behave as non-interacting ideal gas in ALOHA, but in EFFECTS deviations from ideal gas are considered. And, ALOHA dispersion models use surface roughness lengths in a limited fashion and only include 60-min AEGLs. ALOHA does not account for topographic steering or winds that vary with time in EFFECTS. It can be said that the results of the ALOHA Software are more conservative than the EFFECTS Software.